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suPreme courT waTch
recenT decIsIons of seLecTed crImInaL cases | By Joe hernandez
FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Docket Number: 11-345
Argument: October 10, 2012
Issue:
Whether the University of Texas at Austin violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment by explicitly using race as a criterion for 
in-state applicants for the purpose of increasing enrollment of 
Hispanic and African-American 
applicants.
Facts:
The University of Texas at 
Austin (“UT”) denied Petitioner, 
Abigail Fisher, a white female, 
admission to UT when she 
failed to achieve admission 
against minority applicants 
who had lesser credentials as 
measured by standardized tests 
and grades. Students who attend 
a Texas public high school are 
automatically offered admission 
to UT if they achieve a ranking in the top 10% of their graduat-
ing class. Otherwise, race is among a range of factors used to 
evaluate a student’s application.
Fisher was ranked 82nd in her 674-person class at Stephen 
F. Austin High School after having earned a 3.59 out of a 
possible 4.0 grade point average. Having failed to achieve 
admission through a top 10% ranking in her high school, Fisher 
was evaluated against the larger pool of students seeking general 
admission. When she was not admitted, she filed suit against 
UT, arguing that the school’s use of race as a factor in admis-
sion violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The District Court sided 
with UT that its policies conformed to the standard set in Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
decision, and denied a rehearing on banc by a 9-7 vote.
In response to Hopwood v. Texas (5th Cir. 1996), a 
case prohibiting the use of race in admissions, UT adopted 
admissions policies designed to be race neutral. Specifically, 
a Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”) score is calculated based 
on two written essays that an applicant submits in conjunction 
with “personal achievement scores” that includes grades and 
standardized test scores, as well as “special circumstances” 
such as socio-economic status, language(s) spoken at home 
other than English, parental status, etc. Those scores are calcu-
lated then graphed with admission decision based on how well 
a person performs relative to the whole applicant pool.
UT argues that its decision to use race as a factor in 
admissions conforms to the standard set in Grutter by assuring 
race is only among several 
factors used to achieve a 
“critical mass” of minor-
ity students. However, 
Fisher claims that race is 
a predominate factor that 
does not pass strict scrutiny 
review, as set out under 
Grutter. The replacement 
of Justice O’Connor with 
Justice Alito, in light of 
spectacle questioning 
by Alito, Chief Justice 
Roberts, and Justice Scalia, 




Argument: October 10, 2012
Issue:
Whether a conviction under state law for the distribution 
of a minimal amount of marijuana qualifies as an aggravated 
felony.
Facts:
This case involves a Jamaica native, Adrian Moncrieffe, 
who was admitted to the United States lawfully in 1984 as a 
permanent resident. While in Georgia, he was found to be in 
possession of enough marijuana to make approximately two 
joints. He pled guilty to the charges in a Georgia court to 
possession with intent to distribute. The Department of 
64 Fall 2012
Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him 
for being an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and as an 
alien convicted of a controlled substance offense. An immigra-
tion judge concurred with the government that Moncrieffe’s 
crime constituted an “aggravated felony” and was therefore a 
removable offense.
Moncrieffe is not challenging his conviction. Instead, he 
is asserts that his offense—the possession of the marijuana—
was not an “aggravated felony” permitting his removal. The 
case and the statutory basis for it represent a complicated mix 
of federal and state law. First, the immigration judge initially 
determined that while state law formed the basis of Moncrieffe’s 
conviction, the similarities between it and federal law were 
sufficient that his possession of marijuana would be a felony 
under federal law. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concurred 
with the immigration judge.
The case may seem simple on its face, however, the 
nature of immigration law provides categorical authority to 
the Attorney General and delegated officers to exercise certain 
measures of discretion that creates a sort of gray area as to 
what conditions must be met before exercising that discretion. 
Moncrieffe argued in effect that the amount he possessed was 
simply not a felony under federal law and state law definitions 
cannot trump or substitute a federal definition when relating 
to a subject of federal law. The government countered that the 
policy preference of Congress was to establish that seemingly 
small, misdemeanor crimes at the state level when overlap-
ping with federal law could subject a person to removal. In 
oral arguments, reaction to this argument seemed to evoke 
skepticism since it requires piecing together several disparate 
sets of federal laws that the statute in question does not seem 
to invite. Regardless, the case has serious implications for 




Argument: October 31, 2012
Issue:
Whether a dog sniff of the front door by a trained narcotics 
detection dog based on an anonymous tip that a marijuana 
growing operation was occurring inside, constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search requiring probable cause.
Facts:
Police officers received an anonymous tip that Joelis 
Jardines was using his home to grow marijuana. The Miami-
Dade Police Department in conjunction the Drug Enforcement 
Agency conducted warrantless surveillance of the home, and 
observed no apparent activity in and around the home. During 
the course of the surveillance, a drug-sniffing dog and its 
handler walked up to the front of the house. The dog gave a 
positive alert when it sniffed the front door. Based on this 
positive alert, the police sought a full warrant to search the 
house that confirmed the premises were being used as a grow 
house. Prior to approaching the house, police admittedly did not 
have probable cause based on the anonymous tip that Jardines 
was running a marijuana growing operation.
Jardines makes three distinct arguments. First, the prevailing 
assumption accepted by the Court in prior cases that dog sniffs 
are sui generis and detect only for contraband that a person can-
not form a legitimate expectation of privacy is simply is wrong. 
Scientific data and information have tended to suggest that 
dog sniffs are not as reliable as previously thought with tests 
showing a range of critical factors that can lead to false alerts. 
For instance, the substance methyl benzoate is a component of 
cocaine that is also found in flowers, perfumes, and food addi-
tives. The State of Florida and amicus briefs filed in its support 
highlight the indispensable success that government agents 
have with detecting contraband, specifically marijuana, through 
dog sniffs. They assert the track record reveals the overall 
effectiveness of dog sniffs.
Second, allowing dog sniffs of homes without probable 
cause will lead to indiscriminate invasions of privacy of people’s 
homes since law enforcement will be permitted to conduct wide 
sweeps based on mere hunches and intuition. Florida responds 
to this charge by claiming that such concerns are irrational. Dog 
sniffs are a time consuming measures that require highly trained 
and expensive police dogs. The state does not have an interest 
in using that resource poorly, and the concern of neighborhood 
sweeps is impractical. Moreover, they have never happened.
Third, the expectation of privacy in the home is greater than 
anyplace where the sui generis standard has previously been 
applied. In all other cases the item searched was either a piece 
of luggage, car, or item that has been exposed in a public forum 
due to the defendant’s own actions. With Jardines, though, the 
police action encroached specifically onto an area that is not 
transportable or historically granted anything except the highest 
expectation of privacy. Florida argues that the path leading up 
to the home is public in nature because police officers, visitors, 
and mailmen necessarily walk up to without actually peering 
inside the home. This Florida asserts respects the sanctity 
of the home.
The Court’s decision will have a serious impact whichever 
way it resolves the case.
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CHAIDEZ V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 11-820
Argument: November 1, 2012
Issue:
Whether the Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. 
Ct. 1473 (2010) holding that the failure of attorneys of criminal 
defendants to advise their clients that pleading guilty to an 
offense will subject the defendant to deportation constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, 
applies to persons whose convictions became final before its 
announcement.
Facts:
Roselva Chaidez immigrated to the United States from 
Mexico to move to the United States in 1971, and became a 
lawful permanent resident six years later. After being indicted 
on three counts of mail fraud in connection with an insurance 
scheme in 2003, Chaidez, on the advice of her attorney, pleaded 
guilty and received a sentence of four years probation. In 2009, 
the U.S. government began removal proceedings against 
Chaidez, under a federal law allowing for the deportation of 
any alien who commits an aggravated felony.
Chaidez filed for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court then issued 
Padilla v. Kentucky. The district court concluded that the Padilla 
holding applied to Chaidez’s case. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, reversed, reasoning 
that Padilla announced a new rule, and was not retroactively 
applicable in this case.
In Padilla, an individual who had pleaded guilty to a state 
offense sought post-conviction relief. Padilla’a post-conviction 
motion for relief argued that his counsel’s failure to advise him 
that his guilty plea would subject him to virtually automatic 
deportation constituted constitutionally “deficient performance” 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland 
articulated a two-prong test for assessing when “counsel’s 
assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction.” 
First, “the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient.” Second, the defendant must show that he suffered 
prejudice. In Padilla, the Court held that there was deficient 
assistance of counsel, focusing especially on the “prevailing 
professional norms” and “the practice and expectations of the 
legal community” at the time of the plea.
Chaidez focuses on the retroactivity of the Padilla holding. 
Specifically, Chaidez argues that the Court should not hold 
that a new rule is created whenever Strickland’s precedent 
is applied in divergent factual settings for two reasons. First, 
precedent dictated Padilla’s result; like other Strickland cases 
that came before it, the Court in Padilla applied Strickland’s 
rule for evaluating attorney performance according to prevailing 
professional norms to a new set of facts. Second, the lower 
courts who ruled against applying Strickland distinguished 
between acts and omission rather than between deportation 
advice and other types of advice given by an attorney to his 
client. Additionally, Chaidez emphasized that in the twenty 
years since this Court decided Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 
(1989), there have been more than a dozen cases in which 
people have sought habeas relief based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel, but the Supreme Court has never once held that 
applying Strickland in those divergent factual settings consti-
tuted a new rule. The United States countered that Padilla in 
fact created a new rule and could not be applied retroactively by 
Chaidez in collaterally attacking her conviction. This case will 
have important repercussions for attorneys working in immigra-
tion law, and their clients. Moreover, this case highlights the 
intersection between the criminal law and immigrant law fields.
BAILEY V. UNITED STATES
Docket: 11-770
Argument: November 1, 2012
Issue:
Whether police officers may detain a person when executing 
a search warrant after the individual has left the immediate 
vicinity before the warrant is executed.
Facts:
The case involves whether the standard set under Michigan 
v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981)—which provides law 
enforcement with the authority to detain individuals during 
the execution of a search warrant—extends to situations in 
which law enforcement observes a person leaving his premises 
immediately prior to execution of a search warrant of one’s 
home. In Bailey, police officers who observed Bailey leaving 
his apartment, stopped him about three-quarters of a mile from 
the premises. The officials proceeded to search him whereupon 
they found a key that was later learned to open the front door of 
his house. Bailey also made statements connecting him to the 
premises in question. The search of Bailey’s basement apart-
ment turned up drugs and a gun that led to Bailey’s conviction 
for possession of both.
The central issue in the case centers on whether Summers 
provides law enforcement with the ability to detain individuals 
outside the immediate vicinity of where the search of a home 
is be executed. Attorneys for the defendant argue Summers 
was limited to the “immediate vicinity” and that the standard 
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)—reasonable suspicion 
that a person was committing a crime—must be shown before 
police can detain and seize a person outside that immediate 
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vicinity. Moreover, the policy reasons underlying Summers were 
to provide protection to police by fully securing the premises 
to be searched. One additional concern expressed during oral 
argument by Bailey’s attorney is that extending Summers out-
side the immediate vicinity would enable law enforcement to 
detain individuals with any connection to a location.
The government responded that they were not advanc-
ing a rule that enables individual’s to be detained who have a 
mere connection to a premise. Instead, law enforcement must 
establish an observable connection between the individual and 
premises, and the original safety concerns articulated under 
Summers are still applicable even when the person has left the 
premises. Several of the justices appeared skeptical of this argu-
ment and seemed to suggest it was too broad relative to the 
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and particularity standard. 
Additionally, extending Terry would make individuals caught 
in Bailey’s circumstance would make him subject to arrest, 
therefore only Summers properly covers the situation.
The Court’s decision could have a sweeping impact on 
the scope of a search warrant. Siding with the government’s 
position could seemingly enable law enforcement to search 
and detain a person with little actual connection to a premise. 
However, the “immediate vicinity” test argued by Bailey may 




Argument: January 9, 2013
Issue:
Whether a law enforcement officer may obtain a noncon-
sensual and warrantless blood sample from a driver, allegedly 
driving while intoxicated, under the exigent circumstances 
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement based 
upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.
Facts:
After stopping the defendant’s truck for speeding, 
a Missouri state highway patrolman noticed signs of intoxica-
tion and conducted a DWI investigation. After the defendant 
performed poorly on sobriety tests and refused a breath test, the 
officer drove the defendant to a local hospital to test his blood 
to secure evidence of his intoxication. The officer did not seek 
a warrant. There, over the defendant’s refusal, the officer 
directed a phlebotomist to draw the defendant’s blood for 
alcohol testing at 2:33 a.m. The blood sample was analyzed, 
and the results revealed that the blood-alcohol content was well 
above the legal limit.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the results of the 
blood test as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The 
Missouri Supreme Court disagreed with the Missouri Court of 
Appeals and affirmed the ruling of the trial court, holding that 
the nonconsensual and warrantless blood draw was a violation 
of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches of his person. The Missouri Supreme 
Court, reasoning that Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757 (1966) was expressly limited to its facts, noted that the 
patrolman was not confronted with these same “special facts,” 
and concluded that exigent circumstances did not exist for the 
warrantless seizure.
This case represents an opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to rectify a clear and increasing split of authority, which 
has developed among state courts of last resort. Some courts 
have interpreted Schmerber broadly, holding that the natural 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream is sufficient to create 
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw in 
drunk-driving related crimes. Other courts have a more restrictive 
view, amounting to a decision that Schmerber is limited to its 
“special facts.” Missouri argues that due to the divide in juris-
prudence among state courts, this case is a prime candidate for 
certiorari; whereas McNeely argues that this case is an inap-
propriate vehicle for the court to handle the larger issue—when 
exigent circumstances justify a nonconsensual and warrantless 
blood draw—due to the special facts presented by this case and 
issues like an undeveloped and incomplete factual record.
MARYLAND V. KING
Docket Number: 12-207
Argument: February 26, 2013
Issue:
Whether a state law allowing police to collect and analyze 
DNA from people arrested and charged with serious crimes 
violates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.
Facts:
The State of Maryland’s DNA Collection Act provides 
law enforcement the discretion to collect DNA samples from 
individuals for a crime of violence. This includes attempted 
crimes of violence, burglary, attempted burglary, rape, and 
molestation. The defendant, Alonzo Jay King, was arrested for 
first and second degree assault charges. During the duration 
between arrest and trial, King’s DNA sample was matched to 
a sample from an unsolved rape case where the DNA was the 
only piece of evidence linking King to the rape. The victim 
was unable to identify the attacker. A motion to suppress the 
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DNA evidence was denied and King was eventually convicted 
of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison.
The case invites a new analysis into the question set out 
under U.S. v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): (1) Does an individual 
form an expectation of privacy in their DNA? (2) Is that expec-
tation of privacy one that society is prepared to recognize as 
legitimate? In Katz and later cases, the Court has articulated that 
the balance between individual expectations of privacy is in part 
weighed against the nature of the government interest at stake. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding 
the law that permitted police to extract King’s DNA without 
a particularized warrant violated the Fourth Amendment since 
King’s expectation of privacy exceeded the apparent govern-
ment interest at stake.
The briefs in the case are heavily focused on the question as 
to what degree of privacy a pretrial detainee can expect before 
the period of conviction, and whether the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity standard is fulfilled under Maryland’s DNA 
Collection Act. Maryland argues that the interest to resolve 
violent crimes that are otherwise unable to be solved with-
out DNA matches is a legitimate government interest that is 
sufficiently particularized in light of practical limitations. 
The respondent claims that DNA evidence, more than most 
other information, should be provided the highest degree of 
protection, and that the law creates a general warrant against 
pretrial detainees.
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